The Somme is – with Hastings – the battle that is fixed in every Briton’s mind. It has come to symbolise the Great War. Its images of slaughter and sacrifice for limited territorial gains have given birth to a mythology of blind obedience to unthinking and unimaginative orders which could offer no alternative but to fling successive waves of flesh against the iron and steel of wire and machinegun bullet.
That there were great numbers of casualties (the British Army suffered some 57,000 on the first day of the battle, and a total of some 420,000 by the time that the fighting trickled to a close some four and a half months later) is an undeniable and sobering fact. It does, however, obscure the reality that the British Army in 1916 was employing many of the techniques that became regarded as ‘cutting edge’ in management circles some eighty and more years later. The generals at the time were the product of a system of continuous professional development, were members of a learning organisation, were appointed on the basis of regular appraisal and assessment of their competencies, and were practised in the art of leadership in situations which are beyond the experience or comprehension of today’s chief executives. They understood the need for ‘investing in people’, in thorough training and teambuilding, and in communicating clear instructions that explained what to do and why, rather than what to do and how. Far from being the dinosaurs of popular perception, many of them were imaginative thinkers dealing with problems thrust upon them by demanding politicians and an electorate that had not provided them with the tools to fight a modern war. Rapidly developing technology presented new challenges and opportunities. More than this, restrictive trades union practices hindered the production of armaments even while their countrymen were dying on the Western Front for the lack of artillery support.
To all of these problems must be added those of managing a manpower force that had expanded out of all recognition since 1914, while many of the experienced workforce – the original British Expeditionary Force – who might have provided a firm base of professionalism upon which to build, had themselves become casualties. To the enthusiastic but raw British troops were added the Empire contingents, often with alternative approaches to soldiering; and the political and military imperatives of working in co-ordination with allies from other nations, particularly (on the Somme) the French.
As if this scenario was not in itself a major challenge of management and leadership, it must be recognised that the introduction thus far outlines only one side of the picture. The problems faced by the generals and their men were not happening in isolation: the Germans were not sitting idly by waiting for the British and French to make their moves. War is not a game of chess in which each side makes its play in a carefully considered sequence. The competition has its own agenda, part of which is to frustrate your intentions. The more it can throw you off balance by introducing new factors into your planning, the better. For the armies on the ground, as with corporations today, the difficulty is to forecast the intentions of the other side and to understand their thought processes, a difficulty compounded by the differences in culture, education and training instilled by different national backgrounds.
The foregoing does not mean that the British had all of the answers. If they had, they would have achieved their objectives with little or no cost to themselves. It is equally instructive to examine the reasons for failure (as they themselves did) and to draw lessons from their mistakes. The collection of engagements known as the Somme provides an intensive case-study of management which offers lessons for today’s fast-moving and competitive world.
This workshop offers a broad overview of a number of management issues.
- Evening crossing by minibus to Calais via Channel Tunnel and drive to Arras, or by Eurostar for
collection at Lille. Introductory talk on the situation in 1916, strategic leadership, and command and
control. The problems of managing a rapidly expanded organisation, and the new technologies.
- The relationship of the visit to modern management theory is highlighted and the programme put
into context.
- Accommodation: Arras.
- Drive to Serre. Visit site of Pals battalions’ attack on 1 July 1916. Consideration of issues of
teambuilding, training and motivation.
- Drive to Beaumont Hamel. Sunken Road and Hawthorn Ridge. Consideration of leadership at the
operational level. Command and control – the ‘What to do and why, rather than the what to do and
how’ approach.
- Newfoundland Park. Consideration of motivation and communication.
- Lunch in Auchonvillers.
- Ulster Tower. Consideration of national identities and driving forces.
- Thiepville Memorial. Understanding the scale and scope of the management problems.
- Return to Arras.
- Evening session: Consideration of the applicability of today’s lessons to corporate
life.
- Drive to la Boiselle. Recapitulation of previous day’s lessons in a fresh environment.
- Devonshire Cemetery. Leadership at the task level.
- Montaubin. Flexibility in planning. Business process reengineering.
- Delville Wood. The international aspects.
- Pozieres. The international aspects (continued). Technology and innovation.
- Lunch Albert.
- Afternoon session: Consideration of the applicability of today’s lessons to corporate life.
- Return to UK